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I INTRODUCTION 
C an import protection ever act as export promotion? One reason that this is an important question is that i t has often been argued that import 
protection is an explanation of Japanese export success since the war. 
Yamamura (1986) for instance regards i t as an essential part of Japanese 
policy during its "rapid growth phase". He argues that: 
As the firms expanded, the protected markets, which had served as hot 
houses for the fledgling industries, became export platforms easing the 
risks of aggressive expansion into export markets. 
The idea that import protection is export promotion has been formalised by 
Krugman (1984) in a number of partial equilibrium non-cooperative oligo­
polistic trade models. The purpose of what follows is to re-examine the issue 
in a formal two-stage game framework in which firms choose R & D levels in 
the first stage and outputs in the second. 
In this paper I look at international oligopolistic competition in segmented 
markets. This is the same approach as that adopted by Brander (1981), 
Brander and Krugman (1983), Dixit (1984) and Krugman (1984). To make the 
Paper presented at the Fifth Annual Conference of the Ir i sh Economics Association. 
*Helpful comments from Peter Neary and Michael Devereux are gratefully acknowledged. The 
usual disclaimer applies. 
segmented markets assumption is to rule out arbitrage. Firms can in equi­
librium charge different prices in different markets. When this no-arbitrage 
assumption is combined with the assumptions of a fixed number of firms and 
constant marginal costs, markets are unlinked. This means that a tariff, tax 
or subsidy imposed in one market does not affect any other market. There are 
no market spillover effects. Import protection does not help exports nor does 
i t hinder them. The idea that markets are hermetically sealed in this way 
seems implausible, though i t does seem reasonable to suppose that prices or 
quantities can be chosen at least somewhat independently for different 
national markets. Recent work by Ben-Zvi and Helpman (1988) and Venables 
(1990) has combined the segmented markets assumption with market linkage 
by using a two-stage game framework. In these papers firms choose capacity 
in the first stage of a two-stage game on a worldwide integrated basis. Then 
they choose prices in segmented markets. A tariff wi l l have market spillover 
effects in models such as these (see Leahy (1991) for a further discussion). 
Spencer and Brander (1983) also looked at firms playing a two-stage game. 
In their model firms compete in a single market, first choosing R & D and 
then quantity. They use this framework to examine optimal export and R & D 
subsidies. 
The plan of the paper is as follows: After some preliminaries, Section I I 
explores a model in which firms choose process R & D in the first stage of a 
two-stage game on a worldwide integrated basis and then follow this up by 
choosing the quantity for each market. The key result of the section is that 
import protection is export promotion. In Section I I I I consider a situation in 
which both governments have imposed tariffs. Bilateral trade liberalisation is 
then shown to lead to an increase in R & D expenditures and to an increase in 
exports. 
I I A TWO-STAGE GAME I N R & D AND OUTPUT 
In this section I consider an imperfectly competitive model in which there 
are two firms. One of these is located in the home market, the other in a 
foreign market. They each sell in the home and the foreign market. To keep 
the analysis simple I wi l l assume zero transport costs and linear inverse 
demands throughout the paper. The goods produced by the home and foreign 
firms are substitutes. Let 
p(x, y) = a -b (x + ey) 
q(x, y) = a - b(ex + y), 0 < e < l 
(2.1) 
be the home market inverse demand functions for the home and foreign firms 
respectively. The home firm sells at the price p and the foreign firm at the 
price q. The domestic sales of the home firm are represented by x and the 
home market (export) sales of the foreign firm by y. 
The parameter e is a measure of product differentiation. When this par­
ameter has a value of unity the goods are perfect substitutes and for any 
value less than unity but greater than zero the goods are imperfect substi­
tutes. 
The foreign market inverse demands are similarly: 
p*(x*, y*) = a - b(x* + ey*), 
(2.2) 
q*(x*,y*) = a - b(ex* + y*), 
for the home and foreign firms respectively. The home firm's export price is 
p*, and the quantity i t exports is x*. The foreign market (domestic) price of 
the foreign output is q* and the quantity sold is y*. 
In this section the firms play a two-stage game. In the first stage they 
select process R & D expenditures at a global level. This then affects second-
stage marginal production costs. The more R & D that takes place in the first 
stage the lower the second-stage marginal costs, which are assumed constant 
with respect to output. In the second-stage subgame, R & D levels are given 
and firms simply play Cournot in segmented markets. 
Let N and N * be the levels of home and foreign R & D respectively. C ( N ) is 
the home and C * ( N * ) the foreign marginal cost which are restricted as 
follows: 
C ( N ) > 0, C N < N ) < 0, C W N ) > 0, 
(2.3) 
C * ( N * ) > 0, C & ( N * ) < 0, ( & N . ( N * ) > 0. 
The need for the restriction on second derivatives wi l l become clear later. 
Analysis of policy intervention in this section w i l l focus on a tariff t 
imposed by the home government, though similar interesting market linkage 
effects would be obtained by looking at some other policy instrument, for 
instance an import quota. The home firm's profit function can be written as: 
n = xp(x, y) + x*p*(x*, y*) - (x + x * ) C ( N ) - N (2.4) 
I am assuming that the marginal cost of R & D is constant and set equal to 
unity. The foreign firm has the following profit function: 
** = y(q(x, y) -1) + y*q*(x*, y*) - (y + y*) C*(N*) - N * (2.5) 
Following standard practice, I first work out the Nash equilibrium of the 
second stage and then obtain the Nash equilibrium of the first stage subject 
to the second stage of the game being in equilibrium. The home and foreign 
firms are faced with the following second-stage optimisation problems with R 
& D levels fixed: 
™f* * x , y , x * , y * ) , 
(2.6) 
m a £ **(x,y,x*,y*). 
This gives rise to four first-order conditions: 
(i) . J t x (x ,y ;N) = 0 = xp x + p - C ( N ) , (2.7) 
(ii) k * . (x*. y*; N) = 0 = x*p*. + p* - C(N), 
(iii) 7i* (x, y, t; N*) = 0 = yq y + q - (C*(N*) + t) 
(iv) 7 $ (x*. y*; N*) = 0 = y*q£ + q* - C*(N*) 
Since N is fixed, (i) and (i i i ) , which are home market equations, can be 
separated from (ii) and (iv) and solved independently. 
Taking the home market sub-system and substituting from (2.1) yields the 
implicit reaction functions: 
Ttx = a - b(2x + ey) - C(N) = 0, (2.8) 
7C* = a - b(ex + 2y) - [C*(N*) + t] = 0, 
for the home and foreign firm in the home market. I t is easy to solve these 
simultaneously for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium levels of x and y: 
b(4-e 2 )x = (2 -e )a -2C(N) + e(C*(N*) + t), (2.9) 
b(4 - e2)y = (2 - e)a + eC(N) - 2(C*(N*) + t). 
From (2.9) the comparative static properties of this Nash equilibrium can be 
derived: 
x N = - 2CN/b(4 - e2) > 0, y N = eCN/b(4 - e2) < 0, (2.10) 
x N . = eC£«/b(4 - e 2 ) < 0 , y N . = -2C*^b(4 - e2) > 0, 
x t = e/b(4 - e2) > 0, y t = -2/b(4 - e2) < 0. 
Similarly for the foreign market: 
x * = - 2 C N / b ( 4 - e 2 ) > 0 , y* = e ( V b ( 4 - e 2 ) < 0 , (2.11) 
xj* =eC*Jb(4-e 2 )<0 , y*. = -2C*^b(4 - e2) > 0, 
xt = y? = o. 
The equations in (2.10) and (2.11) summarise the comparative statics of 
the second stage. A tariff imposed after R & D levels have been chosen wi l l 
have no foreign market effects, that is to say markets are unlinked. However, 
i f the tariff is in place before the R & D expenditures are made, then i t wi l l 
affect these levels and through this route the outputs of both firms in both 
markets. To see how this happens i t is necessary to consider the first-stage 
equilibrium. In the first stage the home and foreign firms face the following 
optimisation problems respectively: 
" J f K[X(N, N*. t), y (N, N*, t), x*(N, N * ) , y*(N, N * ) , N ] , (2.12) 
iffin* [x(N, N*. t) , y (N, N*, t), x*(N, N * ) , y*(N, N * ) , N*, t ] , 
yielding the following first order conditions: 
(a) n N = J^  = j r y y N + 7 y y £ - [ ( x + x*)C N + 1] = 0 (2.13) 
drc* 
dN* 
+ T&X,*. - [(y + y*) Cj£ + 1] = 0. 
(b) J l $ . s = TC* x N . 
The envelope theorem having been invoked in order to eliminate terms in n*, 
Tlx. , n*,> and 7t*«. 
The equations in (2.13) can be rearranged as follows: 
(a) (x + x*)C N + 1 = Tty y N + Tty* y^ > 0, (2.14) 
(b) (y + y*)C*j. + 1 = 7i* x N . + n ** x^* > 0. 
The terms on the LHS of (2.14) represent the effects of R & D on costs, at con­
stant outputs. I f there was no rival firm these terms would be set equal to 
zero, firms choosing R & D levels to minimise costs. The presence of a rival 
means that firms spend more than the direct cost minimising amount on 
R & D, so as to exploit its "strategic effect". This strategic effect of R & D is 
the effect i t has in reducing foreign sales in both markets and so shifting rent 
to the home firm. This was pointed out by Spencer and Brander (1983). The 
strategic effect is represented by the terms on the RHS of (2.14). 
Using (2.10) and (2.11) the first order conditions can also be rewritten in 
the form: 
T t N = f^r2 (x + x * ) C N - 1 = 0, (2.15) 
<*=TZ7 2 (y + y*)C£. - i = o. 
The second order condition for the home firm is: 
- 4 
"NN = ^ 3 ^ 2 K X N + * N ) C N + (-x + x * ) c N N 1 < 0. (2.16) 
For stability i t is necessary that the overall term in parentheses is positive. 
The term ( x N + x £ , ) C N is negative and so must be dominated by the term 
(x + x * ) C N N . I t must therefore be the case that CNN is strictly positive. Hence 
the restriction on the second derivative of marginal cost given in (2.3) above. 
The cross effect of foreign R & D on the marginal profitability of home R & D 
is: 
- 4 
TCNN* = &N* + x ^ . ) C N < 0. (2.17) 
So R & D expenditures are strategic substitutes: reaction functions are 
negatively sloped in strategy space. See Bulow et al (1985). 
The slope of the home reaction function in R & D space is: 
dN*/dN = - JINN / nm* < 0, 
that of the foreign firm is: 
<!N*/dN = - J i * N / 7 i * . N , < 0 , 
and the stability requirement is: 
A = TCNN tz Jj*N« — 7tNN* n £*N > 0. (2.18) 
Stability in the model is ensured so long as the own effects of R & D on profits 
dominate the cross effects. 
In order to examine the comparative statics of the first stage totally dif­
ferentiate the first stage first-order conditions to get: 
7CNN dN + TCNN* dN* + j i N t dt = 0, (2.19) 
1%*$ dN + TC*;*^ dN* + 7i
 N n dt = 0. 
Then rearrange this to give: 
r^NN TlNN* 1 'dN 
dt 
dN* 
L d t J 
L - 7 I N*tJ 
(2.20) 
which yields solutions for the impact of the tariff on home and foreign R & D : 
dN * , 
"dt = "N*1 7 C N N * ~ RTNT ^ * N * > ° - (2.21) 
dN 
The positive sign of the derivative-^- is guaranteed because 7tN t is positive 
and 7 t N « t is negative. Similarly the response of foreign R & D to the tariff is 
given by: 
dN* 
A—^~ = JtN t Tt^*N - Tt^tj JINN < 0. (2.22) 
Now differentiation of x(N, N*, t), x*(N, N*), y(N, N* , t) and y*(N, N*) yields 









 X N ^ " + x N « + x t > 0, (2.23) 
dx* * dN * dN*
 n 




dt = y^-jr + y*t*-jr + y t < °> 
M _ . , * d N . * 
dt 
dN* 
d T = y N ^ y ^ - d r < o . 
From (2.23 (ii)) i t is possible to obtain the main result of this section. 
Proposition 1: A tariff imposed before firms play a two-stage game, choosing 
R & D globally in the first stage and sales for segmented markets in the 
second stage, wil l be export promoting. 
I I I A FOREIGN TARIFF 
In the previous section I demonstrated that import protection can help 
exports through its effect on R & D expenditure levels. Suppose now that both 
governments are using tariffs to protect their own firm, then a question 
arises: How would an agreed reduction in tariffs affect exports? 
In this section the foreign government imposes the tariff t*. The home 
profit function is now: 
JI = x p(x, y) + x* { p * ( x * , y * ) - t * ] - ( x + x*)C(N)-N. , (3.1) 
The foreign profit function is still given in (2.5). 
As before I begin by considering the second stage in which the firms choose 
quantities, given R & D levels. The first-order conditions are: 
(i) Ttx = a - b(2x + ey) — C(N) = 0, (3.2) 
(ii) Jtx. = a - b(2x* + ey*) - [C(N) + t*] = 0, 
(iii) rc* = a-b(ex + 2y)-[C*(N*) + t] = 0, 
(iv) 7 # = a-b(ex* + 2y*)-C*(N*) = 0. 
As in Section I I the system is separable into one sub-system for the home 
market and one for the foreign market. The Equations (i) and (iii) represent 
the home market reaction functions of the home and foreign firms respec­
tively. They yield the home market outputs which are represented in (2.9). 
The foreign market sub-system (ii) and (iv) can be solved to give: 
(i) b(4-e 2 )x* = (2-e)a-2(C(N) + t*) + eC*(N*), (3.3) 
(ii) b(4 - e2)y* = (2 - e)a + e(C(N) + t*) - 2C*(N*). 
The foreign market comparative static derivatives are now: 
x£ = - 2 C N / b ( 4 - e 2 ) > 0 , y* N = eCN/b(4 - e2) < 0, (3.4) 
x£. = e C V b ( 4 - e 2 ) < 0, y V = -2C^b(4 - e2) > 0, 
xt*. = - 2 / b ( 4 - e 2 ) < 0 , y*t* = e/b(4 - e2) > 0. 
Turning now to the first-stage, the first-order conditions for choice of R & D 
are still represented by the equation in (2.15). The only difference is now that 
TIN and 7^* both depend on t*. 
I now wish to examine the impact of change in t and t*. In order to keep 
the analysis manageable I wi l l impose the following Assumptions A.1 and 
A 2 : 
Identical cost functions: ( A 1) 
i f N = N * C ( N ) = C*(N*) 
C N ( N ) = Q$. (N*) 
CNN(N) = C N . N . ( N * ) 
Identical tariffs: (A2) 
t = t* = x. 
Taken together with the other assumptions of the model these imply a sym­
metrical equilibrium, i.e., x = y*, x* = y and N = N* . 
The home and foreign second order conditions for optimal choice of R & D 
are now equal. 
JCJJN = JIN*N* (3.5) 
The cross effects of rival R & D on marginal profitability of own R & D must 
also be the same for the home and foreign firm: 
7CNN* = NN*N (3.6) 
The impact of an equal change in tariff levels on the marginal profitability of 
R & D is captured by the following: 
(i) 7 t N x = - 4 C N ( x t + x?i)/(4-e 2 ) (3.7) 
(ii) - 4C& (y t + yf. V (4 - e2). 
The use of (2.10) and (3.4) together with ( A l ) and (A.2) yields: 
"NT = = 4 C V b ( 4 - e2)(2 + e) (3.8) 
Now totally differentiate the first-order conditions for R & D choice and solve 
for the impact of tariff changes on R & D: 
« flC-J*-^ (3 . 9 ) 
U T Q X U N N + N N N * 
Differentiation of x*(N, N*, x) and y(N, N*, x) yields: 
dx* dN ^ d N * 3xJ^  
dx = X ^ d T + 5 « * dT + dx' 
dy dN dN* 9y 
d i = y N d t + y N * dx + d f 
(3.10) 
The use of (2.10), (3.4) and (3.9) in (3.10) gives: 
dx* dy ftNt C N 
dx dT (TCNN + TCNN*) b(2 + e) b(4 - e2) < 0. (3.11) 
Proposition 2: Starting at a symmetrical equilibrium an equal increase in 
both the home and foreign tariff (i) reduces R & D expenditures, (ii) reduces 
exports. 
TV CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Krugman (1984) was the first work to analyse theoretically the "import 
protection as export promotion thesis". In this paper I extended that work 
examining the thesis within the framework of a formal two-stage game. I 
have shown that the thesis continues to hold for a unilateral tariff when firms 
choose R & D expenditures before outputs. However, i f both governments 
impose tariffs and they agree to change these bilaterally, then import pro­
tection is not export promotion. 
The main result of the paper (Proposition 1) concurs with the results in 
Krugman (1984). However i t is worth exploring what happens under different 
assumptions about strategic variables and firms' behaviour. For instance i t is 
at least as plausible to suppose that firms choose price and let demand deter­
mine sales as i t is to suppose they choose quantity. Recently firms have been 
modelled choosing their productive capacity in the first stage and following 
this up by choosing price in the second stage. Papers by Kreps and Scheink-
man (1983), Ben Zvi and Helpman (1988) and Venables (1990) have all 
adopted that framework. I have examined the implications of this elsewhere. 
In Leahy (1991) I show that when firms play a two-stage game choosing R & 
D in the first stage and price in the second that the "import protection export 
promotion" result continues to hold, but that in a capacity-price game tariff 
protection actually hurts exports. 
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